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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.9800035-CA

v.
JOSEPH K. KRUEGER and MARY A
SAWYERS,

Priority No. 10

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(d)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: As a matter of law, may journalists covering a story on the dangers of chewing
tobacco be criminally prosecuted under Utah's contributing to the delinquency of minors
statute for allegedly asking 17-year-old high school students to "chew" on camera1 where
the journalists did not provide the tobacco, and the students already possessed and were
predisposed to use chewing tobacco?

1

Defendants deny asking the students to chew tobacco. However, for the purpose of
their Motion to Dismiss, defendants assumed the state's contention that the students would
testify that Sawyers and ICrueger asked them to chew for purposes of obtaining videotape of
the students' use of chewing tobacco.

This issue was preserved in appellants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. at 30-55, and during the hearing on the Motion, R. at 153.
Standard of Review: The district court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law
that this Court reviews without deference. State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995)
("The standard of review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule or statute is correctness.").
Issue: If journalists may be prosecuted under the statute for the news gathering
activities involved here, is the statute unconstitutional as applied under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 15
of the Utah Constitution?
This issue was preserved in appellants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. at 30-55, and during the hearing on the Motion, R. at 153.
Standard of Review: The district court's decision on constitutional questions is
reviewed by this Court without deference. State v. Arbon. 909 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah App.
1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const, amend. I
U.S. Const amend. XIV
Utah Const, art. I, § 15

2

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a) (1996)
lHali I Vile Ann !j / » III l<)> i \WM
Utah Code X iim §76-2 101 (19S 5;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1995)
All constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the resolution of the
issues before this Cc i it I: ai e : en itained ii l tl i.e Addendum to this brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Proceedings.

This is an appeal from interlocutory orders of the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, Seventh

Informations charging them with violating Utah Code Ami § 78-3a-801(1 )(a) (1996) —
contributing to the delinquency of minors.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings.

On M a y 2, 199 7

< VrV

,

•-

.- «":

~

-> •* - *

alleging that appellants Joseph K. Krueger and Mary Ann Sawyers each violated Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a) (1996). The charges arise from interviews these two journalists

the school. Sawyers and Krueger entered not guilty pleas on J unc 17, 1^9 7.

3

Sawyers and Krueger timely filed a Motion to Dismiss the Informations. Oral
argument was heard on November 3,1997. In support of their Motion, Sawyers and Krueger
argued that the Informations should be dismissed principally for three reasons. First,
Sawyers and Krueger did not have the requisite intent to violate the statute because they
interacted with the students solely for the purpose of gathering information and videotaped
pictures for a news story. Second, their alleged conduct did not violate the statute. Third, the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Sections 15 of the Utah Constitution
prohibit criminal prosecution of journalists for the news gathering activities involved here.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Bryner dismissed one count of the Informations
which concerned a student who was 18 years old at the time of the interviews and,
accordingly, not a minor. On January 2,1998, Judge Bryner issued a written ruling denying
in part and granting in part appellants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court granted Sawyers' and
Krueger's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
C.

Statement of Facts.

On February 18, 1997, Richard L. Bender, a self-described "victim" of "smokeless"
or "chewing" tobacco, appeared at Carbon High School in Price, Utah, to speak to students
as part of the school's effort to discourage the use of chewing tobacco. R. at 60.
Prior to the assembly, Rebecca Murphy, an employee of the Utah Department of
Health (UDOH), which sponsored Bender's lecture tour at numerous Utah schools, invited
media organizations to attend and cover Bender's presentation. R. at 95-96.

4

KTVX, Channel 4, received the invitation and assigned appellants to cover Bender's
presentation. Sawyers, an award-winning news reporter for KTVX, assigned to cover health
and medical topics, and KI V X cameraman Krueger arrived at Carbon High School shortly

and asked her to try to locate students who used chewing tobacco and would be willing to be
interviewed. Sawyers wanted to interview those students to determine the impact of
Bender's presentation on tl le students who used chewing tobacco, R at 1 2

identified two students, both of whom said they used chewing tobacco and agreed to be
interviewed by Channel 4. R. at 60, 72,
Saw y ersandK n n «.. . .
interviewed Bender aboir

3

^xnern:

assembly, filmed Bender's entire presentation and
^ n- -Au \ *

%

'

explained to students how he began using chewing tobacco at age 12. At age 26, he was
diagnosed with cancer, Over the next four years, Bender underwent a series of surgical

third of his tongue, half of his jaw and 25 percent of the use in his right arm. He told the
students he nearly died. R. at 73; see "Quit Dippin'" (KTVX, Channel 4, television
broadcast, February 1 '•

s

a true and correct videotaped copy of which was submitted

tothedistri

1.

5

After the assembly, Sawyers and Krueger met with the two students identified by Ms.
Ferguson as users of chewing tobacco. The two, the minors identified in Counts I and II of
the Informations, told Sawyers they did use chewing tobacco. Sawyers asked the students
where and when they chewed tobacco. They said they used chewing tobacco in the school
parking lot during lunch. She asked if they planned to chew that day, and they said they did.
She then asked the students if they would be willing to be filmed and interviewed. They
agreed. R. at 63.
Sawyers and Krueger accompanied the two boys to the high school parking lot where
they met other students who also said they used chewing tobacco and wanted to be
interviewed. As they talked, some of the students produced cans of chewing tobacco and
began chewing. Id In their statements to police, some of the students claimed that Sawyers
and Krueger asked them to chew tobacco on camera and told them that they would not get
in trouble for doing so. R. at 61-62, 65-70, 79-81, 83-85.2
The State does not allege that the journalists provided chewing tobacco to the
students. R. at 153, p. 28.3 Nor does the State allege that any non-user was asked to chew

2

Sawyers and Krueger told the police, and adamantly assert, that they did not ask the
students to chew tobacco. Rather, appellants maintain that they only asked the students to
do what they would ordinarily do. R. at 62-63. As noted above, however, for purposes of
their Motion and this appeal, defendants assume that some of the students would testify that
appellants asked them to chew tobacco for the camera.
3

Because the transcript of the November 3, 1997, hearing before the district court is
designated by a single number in the record, the individual page numbers will be cited for
the convenience of the Court.
6

tobacco I d In fact, as the news story made clear, those who were interview cd

habitual

users. I d ; see also R at I 34. 3 31.
The story, broadcast that evening, featured excerpts from Bender's lecture and

included footage of the students chewing tobacco and comments from the students who
stated that although Bender's presentation caused them some concerns about the dangers of
( ..

mg tobacco, they had no immediate plans to quit: R at 134, 3 3 1 .
] n:--of the students w h o were filmed

and Mike Andrieni, all age 1 /

I i e v or R obe i its Pi: av is Wilberg, R yari I .ee,

were issued "Tobacco Citations" by Carbon High School

and referred to Seventh District Juvenile Court for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-105
(1996), w hieli prol libits tl le possession of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco by minors. K
90. One student, Tyler Minchey, was issued a citation for tl :ie same violatioi I a "

> :>

appear in Carbon County Justice Court, apparently because he was 18 years old at the time
of the incident and not subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a1
On M a y 2, 1997, the Carbon County Attorney filed two five-count Informations
alleging that Sawyers and Krueger violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a) (1996). R.
at 3-4 S a \ \ \ e i s jiiil I'uiUi :.... i iii <..ll ilisinr. * Ilk1 lnlonnulu us. U »il .l1 '-1 Judge Bryner
heard oral arguments on November '!, I^>"'

During tli I IUMIIIIL', I IK- 'f.itbon <'miniy

Attorney made a number of significant concessions. First, the State conceded that the only

7

crime that the students could be charged with was possession of tobacco because there is no
statute specifically outlawing the use of chewing tobacco on school grounds. R. at 153, pp.
25-26. Second, the State conceded that all of the students who were filmed already had
chewing tobacco in their possession and that Sawyers and Krueger did not provide tobacco
to any of them. R. at 153, p. 28. Third, the State conceded that it has the burden of proving
that Sawyers and Krueger acted intentionally or knowingly in order to be convicted of
violating the statute. R. at 153, p. 4. Finally, the State stipulated to the dismissal of Count
4 of the Informations because the student named in that count, Tyler Minchey, was not a
minor and, therefore, his conduct could not constitute the basis for a contributing to the
delinquency of a minor charge. R. at 153, p. 3.
By order dated January 2, 1998, Judge Bryner granted in part and denied in part
appellants' Motion to Dismiss. First, the district court agreed that the journalists could not
be prosecuted under subsection (i) of the statute making it a crime to solicit, request,
command, encourage, or intentionally aid or "act[] with a minor in the violation of any
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance," Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i),
because the offense with which the students were charged was possession, and the State did
not contend Sawyers or Krueger provided the tobacco. However, Judge Bryner ruled that
Sawyers and Krueger could be prosecuted under subsection (ii) of the statute which prohibits
an adult from doing any act "which tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent;

8

. . . " Id., § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii). The district court also rejected, without analysis, appellants'
claim that the statute was unconstitutional, as applied. R. at 139-140.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Journalists engaged in the process of gathering and reporting the news cannot be
prosecuted for contributing to the delinquency of minors under the circumstances of this
case. First, as a matter of law, the journalists did not violate the terms of the statute. They
did not provide the tobacco to the students and they did not induce any non-user to begin
using chewing tobacco. Nor did they have the criminal intent necessary to violate the statute.
Second, prosecuting Sawyers and Krueger for contributing to the delinquency of minors
would violate constitutional free speech and free press guarantees. As applied here, § 78-3a801(l)(a)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague and otherwise invalid under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INFORMATIONS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE SAWYERS
AND KRUEGER DID NOTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
DELINQUENCY OF MINORS
A.

Sawyers and Krueger Did Not Contribute to the Students' Possession of
Tobacco

Sawyers and Krueger cannot be prosecuted under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)
because their actions do not come within the statutory definitions of the offense. The statute
is violated when any person 18 years or older

9

(i)

solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
o r . . . acts with a minor in the violation of any federal, state, or
local law or municipal ordinance; [or]

(ii)

tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent;...

Sawyers and Krueger argued, and the district court agreed, that subsection (i) cannot
apply to their alleged conduct because they did nothing to contribute to the violation of law
with which the students were charged. The students each were charged with violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-105 (1995), which states:
Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a Class C
misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added). The State admits that Sawyers and Krueger did not supply or in any way
further or facilitate the purchase, receipt or possession of tobacco by the students. Indeed,
there is no dispute that the students already were in possession of the chewing tobacco before
Sawyers and Krueger arrived on the scene. See R. at 139-140; R. at 153, p. 28. Thus, it is
simply not possible for the reporters to have solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged,
or intentionally aided or acted with the students in violation of § 76-10-105.
Subsection (ii) cannot apply to Sawyers or Krueger because the "delinquency" alleged
is the students' possession of chewing tobacco. Again, because Sawyers and Krueger did
nothing to facilitate the possession of tobacco by the students, they cannot be convicted of
doing an act that "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent."

10

The district court erroneously rejected this argument, ruling that although Sawyers and
Krueger could not be prosecuted under section (i) because they did nothing to facilitate the
possession of chewing tobacco, they could nonetheless be prosecuted under section (ii) of
the statute because their alleged actions could tend "to cause minors to become or remain
delinquent." As argued in section II. below, subsection (ii), so interpreted, is void because
it would be unconstitutionally vague as applied to Sawyers and Krueger.
B.

As a Matter of Law, Sawyers and Krueger Did Not Have the Mental State
Required To Violate the Statute

Sawyers and Krueger cannot be convicted of contributing to the delinquency of
minors because they did not have the intent necessary to commit the crime. A defendant
cannot be convicted of a crime without some level of criminal intent. Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-101 (1995),
[n]o person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is
prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified
in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the
offense requires;. ..
During argument on appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the State conceded that it must
prove that the journalists acted intentionally or knowingly to obtain convictions. R. at 153,
p. 4. According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1995),
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
11

it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.
Sawyers and Krueger cannot be held criminally liable for being present when minors
were violating state law.4 Moreover, even assuming, as appellants do for the purpose of
their Motion and for this appeal, that Sawyers and Krueger suggested that the students chew
the tobacco already in their possession, the journalists still cannot be criminally liable
because their intent was not to tempt minors to illegal conduct, but rather to cover a news
story thoroughly.
News reporting, we can assume, no matter how explicit it is in
its description or depiction of criminal activity, could never
serve as a basis for aiding and abetting liability consistent with
the First Amendment. It will be self-evident in the context of
news reporting, if nowhere else, that neither the intent of the

4

See Ronald M. v. White. 169 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372 (1980) (Carr, J., concurring)
(defendant who was in presence of minor who had alcohol or drug paraphernalia in his
possession, and fails to intervene, cannot be liable for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor); State v. Grove. 486 P.2d 615, 617 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) ("If, from the evidence, it
may be inferred that defendant was present when the juvenile engaged in his admitted
activities with marijuana, there is no evidence that defendant had anything to do with these
activities; no evidence that defendant approved of such activities. In the absence of such
evidence, an inference that defendant was present when the juvenile engaged in his marijuana
activities is insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for contributing to the delinquency
of the juvenile."); Gray v. State. 233 N.E.2d 468, 469-70 (Ind. 1968) (defendant's mere
presence at beer party at which minors were drinking does not constitute contributing to the
delinquency of a minor).
12

reporter nor the purpose of the report is to facilitate repetition of
the crime, or other conduct reported upon, but, rather merely to
report on the particular event, and thereby to inform the public.
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. Inc.. 128 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 66
U.S.L.W. 3686 (1998). In short, journalists in the process of reporting the news do not have
the intent necessary to aid and abet the commission of a crime.
Sawyers and Krueger did not knowingly or intentionally do anything that tended "to
cause minors to become or remain delinquent." The journalists did not create or fabricate
the story. Obviously, the problem of the use of chewing tobacco by minors already existed;
that was the reason Carbon High officials decided to sponsor Bender's presentation. The
journalists' only intent was to cover thoroughly a news event about the efforts to convince
teenagers of the dangers of using chewing tobacco. To do so, it was essential that Sawyers
and Krueger not merely recount Bender's presentation, but also to gauge its impact on
students.
Sawyers and Krueger had a responsibility to determine whether such anti-tobacco
efforts are impacting those most at risk — high school students currently using tobacco. To
that end, it was logical, proper and professionally necessary to interview students who
chewed tobacco to determine whether Bender's presentation had the desired effect.5 What

5

In fact, it would have been a deviation from journalistic standards if Sawyers and
Krueger had not interviewed the students. One of the most basic tenets of journalism is to
attempt to report all relevant sides of any story. See, e.g.. In re United Press Int'l. 1989 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 13927 (D. D.C.), **25, n.18 ("[T]he more factually involved and one-sided a
report is, the greater becomes the reporter's obligation to report both sides of the story.");
13

the journalists discovered is that for the students interviewed even the possibility of
permanent disfigurement or death is not enough incentive to quit. This is a critical aspect of
the story.
Sawyers and Krueger cannot be held liable under Utah law. They were invited to
Carbon High School as professional journalists. Even assuming that the students were
correct - which they are not - in stating that Sawyers and Krueger asked them to chew for
the camera, the interactions among Sawyers, Krueger and the students must be viewed within
the context of broadcast journalists interviewing news sources.6 The process of collecting

Dalheim v. KDFW-TV. 706 F. Supp. 493, 497 (N.D. Tex. 1988) ("[Reporters attempt to
present a balanced story in which both sides are given a fair opportunity forcefully to
articulate their position in their own words."), affd Dalheim v. KDFW-TV. 918 F.2d 1220
(5th Cir.1990); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell 333 F. Supp. 582, 590 (D. D.C. 1971)
("The theory of free speech is grounded on the belief that people will make the right choice
if presented with all points of view on a controversial issue."), affd Capital Broadcasting Co.
v. Acting Attorney Gen.. 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
6

During oral argument on appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the Carbon County
Attorney suggested that the reporters "orchestrated" the story and implied that the reporters'
actions encouraged or glamorized the use of chewing tobacco. See R. at 153, p. 28-30.
These contentions are both factually baseless and legally and constitutionally irrelevant.
First, this was not an "orchestrated" or fabricated story. Carbon High School students
use chewing tobacco. The very fact that Carbon High officials devoted school time for an
assembly for Bender's presentation demonstrates that the school officials, laudably,
acknowledge they have this serious public health problem. And the fact that Ms. Ferguson,
the administration representative, could and readily did identify for Sawyers and Krueger
students who were users of chewing tobacco further underscores the reality of the problem
of student-use of chewing tobacco at Carbon High. The scene depicted in the videotape of
the students using chewing tobacco in the school parking lot during lunch was not fiction.
It is a scene likely replayed on most school days in most high school parking lots, including
Carbon High's. The students themselves told the reporters that they used chewing tobacco
during the lunch break in the school parking lot.
14

visual images to illustrate the story is essential to television journalism and, accordingly,
entitled to First Amendment protections.
The adage that "one picture is worth a thousand words" reflects
the common-sense understanding that illustrations are an
extremely important form of expression for which there is no
genuine substitute . . . [A] statute that substantially abridges a
uniquely valuable form of expression of this kind cannot be
defended on the ground that . . . the speaker can express the
same ideas in some other way.
Regan v. Time. Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 677 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Of course, the Constitution does not insulate reporters from all criminal liability. But
the culpable mental state necessary for Sawyers and Krueger to violate the statute requires
that they do more than what the State alleges — suggest that the students chew tobacco for
the camera — especially when it is undisputed that the students already possessed the
chewing tobacco and that they had used chewing tobacco for some time prior to the
interviews. The two journalists cannot be prosecuted for thoroughly reporting on an

Second, while journalistic attention to those engaged in hazardous or unlawful
activities may "encourage" or "glamorize" the activities to some of those so engaged, it
obviously is untenable to punish journalists for this assumed incidental effect of their
reporting the news. Whatever the psychological effect news coverage has on those engaged
in crime or unhealthy activities, the public needs — and has a constitutional right — to know
about criminal or unhealthy activities, particularly when children are involved. Reporters
covering these stories, constitutionally and legally, cannot be held liable "even if, in some
circumstances, [news media coverage] incidentally glamorizes and thereby indirectly
promotes such conduct." Paladin. 128 F.3d at 266.
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important public health issue.7 As the Paladin court stated: "News reporting, we can assume,
no matter how explicit it is in its description or depiction of criminal activity, could never
serve as a basis for aiding and abetting liability consistent with the First Amendment." WL,
128 F.3d at 266. The charges against Sawyers and Krueger must be dismissed.
II.

PROSECUTING SAWYERS AND KRUEGER FOR VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-801 WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF UTAH
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii), as Applied in This
Case, is Unconstitutionally Vague.

As applied to Sawyers and Krueger, § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague.
Due process requires that a law give an ordinarily intelligent person reasonable notice of
what is prohibited so that he or she may govern his or her actions accordingly. Grayned v.
City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).8 The vagueness doctrine also requires that the
law provide explicit standards for those who apply it. As the Supreme Court stated in
Grayned:

7

Reporters regularly publish and broadcast stories about efforts to keep minors from
engaging in illegal activities. These stories frequently feature interviews with minors
involved in the illegal activities and show them breaking the law. See, e ^ , Joseph Bauman,
Youth find many ways to frustrate the law. Deseret News, August 2,1997, at Al (news story
about underage smokers, some of whom were interviewed and photographed while smoking).
R. at 98.
8

A statute is void for vagueness "unless it defines the area of illegal conduct with
sufficient specificity so that 'men of common intelligence [need not] guess at its meaning .
..'" Hiettv. United States. 415 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Connally v. General
Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)), cert, denied. United States v. Hiett 397 U.S. 936
(1970).
16

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.
Id. at 108-09. Laws failing to meet these criteria are unconstitutional. Id
The First Amendment, as well as Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution,9
provide an independent source of the vagueness doctrine.
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When
First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely
lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by
the police power, freedom of speech and of the press suffer.
Ashton v. Kentucky. 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966).10 Where First Amendment rights are
concerned, the "'premise [is] that [precision] of regulation must be the touchstone . . .'"
Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. Citv of Dallas. 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)).11
9

Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which reads in part "No law shall be
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press .. ." provides at least as
much protection as the First Amendment. KUTV. Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983).
10

See Smith v. California. 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("[Stricter] standards of
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting
effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free
dissemination of ideas may be the loser.").
11

The significance of a free press to our democratic society need not be belabored
here. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize the values at issue in this case. As Justice
Sutherland stated: "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the
government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v.
American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). Moreover, as Justice Black noted in the
"Pentagon Papers" case: "In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press
the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to
17

Even statutes with the laudable goal of protecting children must pass Constitutional
scrutiny.

Protecting minors is obviously an important state interest; however, "[t]he

permissible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of
the power to regulate or control expression with respect to children." Interstate Circuit. 390
U.S. at 689. Free speech and free press protections prevail over the state's interest in
protecting juveniles. See, &&, Smith v. Dailv Mail Publishing Co.. 443 U.S. 97,104 (1979)
(First Amendment right of newspaper to publish name ofjuvenile offender outweighs state's
interest in protecting the identities ofjuvenile offenders). When First Amendment rights are
at stake, a state "may not use a vague and imprecise 'contributing to the delinquency of a
minor' statute to protect its minors . . . . " Entertainment Ventures. Inc. v. Brewer. 306 F.
Supp. 802, 820 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
In Entertainment Ventures, prosecutors attempted to apply the Alabama contributing
statute to drive-in movie theater owners showing allegedly obscene films. The Alabama
statute stated: "'It shall be unlawful for any parent, guardian, or other person to aid,
encourage, or cause any child under eighteen years of age to become or remain dependent,
neglected or delinquent...'" Id. at 808 (statutory citation omitted). The court permanently
enjoined prosecution of the theater owners under the statute:

serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people." New
York Times v. United States. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
18

Phrases such as 'to cause any child to become delinquent,' ; to
induce, aid or encourage any child,' . . . cannot meet the strict
standard of specificity required in a criminal statute affecting
expression protected by the first amendment.
Id. at 819.
The relevant language of § 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) is virtually identical to the language
of the Alabama statute and, thus, subject to the same constitutional infirmities. Section 783a-801(l)(a)(ii), which makes it illegal for a person 18 or older to do any act which "tends
to cause minors to become or remain delinquent," is simply too vague to apprise news
reporters that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview and film juveniles
engaged in illegal behavior. Such a vague statute is subject to abuse by law enforcement and
other officials who may use it against journalists who, like Sawyers and Krueger, report on
issues that public officials may deem embarrassing. See New York Times Co. v. United
States. 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) ("The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was
to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information.") (Black and Douglas, J.J., concurring).12
News gathering, as well as news reporting, is protected by the First Amendment and
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. "[WJithout some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665,

12

Unfortunately, it appears that these prosecutions are the result of pressure from
Carbon High School officials who believed — erroneously — that the Channel 4 story cast the
school in an embarrassing light.
19

681 (1972). Prosecution under a statute so clearly inapplicable to journalists in the process
of gathering information to report the news cannot be permitted. Such a prosecution has an
unconstitutionally chilling effect on all journalists, and the public's right to know will suffer.
"The chilling effect upon exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the
prosecution unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure." Dombrowski v. Pfister.
380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).13
B.

Even if the Utah Statute Were Not Unconstitutionally
Vague, It Still Violates Free Speech and Press Guarantees of
the United States and Utah Constitutions as Applied to the
Journalists in This Case

Even if § 78-3a-801(1 )(a)(ii) were not unconstitutionally vague — which it is —
prosecuting journalists engaged in news gathering activities under these circumstances is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah
Constitution. These reporters did not supply the tobacco. The students already possessed it
and were regular users. Thus, the reporters did nothing to induce or encourage use of
tobacco by any student who was not already a user. For effective news coverage of an
important public health story, the reporters videotaped for their public audience the issue they
were covering — the use by minors of chewing tobacco they already possessed and were
predisposed to use. The State constitutionally cannot punish this conduct. See, e ^ , Smith

13

The Supreme Court has warned that "[t]he severity of criminal sanctions may well
cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words,
ideas, and images." Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2345 (1997).
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v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.. 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979); People v. Denver Pub. Co.. Inc.. 597
P.2d 1038, 1040 (Colo. 1979) (statute imposing criminal sanctions for publishing photo of
participants in juvenile proceeding violates free speech and due process protections of state
and federal constitutions).
CONCLUSION
Constitutional free speech and free press guarantees protect reporters gathering and
reporting the news. They do so, not because reporters are a privileged class, but rather
because reporters perform a service, indispensable to our democratic form of government,
for all of us. As citizens, we need to know about crime and public health issues. As citizens
and parents, we need to know when our children are engaging in hazardous and unlawful
conduct; what government officials are doing about it; and the efficacy of their efforts.
The prosecutions at issue here are improperly motivated, legally unsound and
constitutionally prohibited. The Informations must be dismissed.
DATED this 2^.

day of May, 1998.
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C.

jregdry G. SWcras
Brett JvDelPorftr
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers,]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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Art. I, § 15

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Cited in State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1301
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

P.2d 1302 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894,
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82.
Note, State v. Nielsen: Immaterial False
Statements in Search Warrant Affidavits, 1987
Utah L. Rev. 753.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Labor Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 284.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Procedure, 1989
Utah L. Rev. 223.
Brigham Young Law Review. — An Analytical Model to Assure Consideration of Parental and Familial Interests When Defining
the Constitutional Rights of Minors — An Examination of In re Scott K, 1980 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 598.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note
discussing "open fields" doctrine, 11 J.
Contemp. L. 531 (1985).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches
and Seizures § 6 et seq.
C.J.S. — 79 CJ.S. Searches and Seizures
§ 3 et seq.
AJL.R. — Admissibility, in civil case, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure,
5 AXiUd 670.
Lawfulness of seizure of property used in violation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action
or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473.
Validity of consent to search given one in
custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858.
Traffic violation: lawfulness of search of motor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation,
10 AX.R.3d 314.
Propriety of considering hearsay or other incompetent evidence in establishing probable
cause for issuance of search warrant, 10
A.L.R.3d 359.
Criminal liability for obstructing process as
affected by invalidity or irregularity of the process, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146.
Sufficiency of description, in search warrant,

of apartment or room to be searched in multiple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330.
Modern status of rule as to validity of
nonconsentual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by
lapse of time between, or difference in places
of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727.
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful
search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.3d 724.
Propriety of execution of search warrant at
nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951.
Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on
communications between accused and his attorney, 44 A.L.R.4th 841.
Validity of arrest made in reliance upon uncorrected or outdated warrant list or similar
police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550.
Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting admissibility of plain-view evidence—modern
cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425.
Search and seizure: necessity that police obtain warrant before taking possession of, examining, or testing evidence discovered in
search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501.
Eavesdropping on extension telephone as invasion of privacy, 49 A.L.R.4th 430.
Propriety of state or local government health
officer's warrantless search — post-Camara
cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168.
Seizure of books, documents, or other papers
under search warrant not describing such
items, 54 A.LR.4th 391.
Search and seizure of telephone company
records pertaining to subscriber as violation of
subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 A.L.R.4th
536.
Necessity that Miranda warnings include express reference to right to have attorney
present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R. Fed.
123.
Fourth Amendment as prohibiting strip
searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees, 78
A.L.R. Fed. 201.
Key Numbers. — Searches and Seizures *=>
2, 7(1).

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the
law and the fact.
112

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Section
76-2-305.

76-2-306.
76-2-307.
76-2-308.

Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influence of alcohol
or other substance voluntarily consumed — Definition.
Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary termination of efforts
prior to offense.
Affirmative defenses.

Section
76-2-402.
76-2-403.
76-2-404.
76-2-405.
76-2-406.

76-2-101

Force in defense of person —
Forcible felony defined.
Force in arrest.
Peace officer's use of deadly
force.
Force in defense of habitation.
Force in defense of property.

Part 4
Justification Excluding Criminal
Responsibility
76-2-401.

Justification as
When allowed.

defense

—

PARTI
CULPABILITY GENERALLY
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal
responsibility.
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability.
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, ch. 90, § 1;
1983, ch. 98, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Criminal negligence.
Mental state.
Criminal negligence.
The bending down of a stop sign at an intersection so that it was not visible to traffic was
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980).
Mental state.
Public officer was not punishable for an act
committed innocently without criminal intent,
where statute, with no reference to mental

state, made private appropriation of public
money a felony. State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175,53 P.
978 (1898).
In prosecution for grand larceny of steer, trial
court's refusal to permit defendant to testify as
to his intent and belief in possessing and claiming animal was erroneous. State v. Sawyer, 54
Utah 275, 182 P. 206 (1919).
Intent was an essential element of first degree murder, it was reversible error to refuse to
allow defendant to testify in regard thereto.
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050, 79
A.L.R. 878 (1931).
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PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

76-2-103

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
History: C 1953, 76-2-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Criminal negligence.
—Expert testimony.
Malice.
Proof of intent and malice.
Recklessness.
Willfulness.
Cited.
Criminal negligence.
The bending down of a stop sign at an intersection so that it was not visible to traffic was
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980).
The sole difference between reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide is whether
the defendant actually knew of the risk of death
or was not, but should have been, aware of it. In
both cases, a defendant's conduct must be a
"gross deviation" from the standard of care
exercised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-

nary negligence, which is the basis for a civil
action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).
—Expert testimony.
While expert testimony is not required to
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant
accused of homicide, expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is alleged and
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden,
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reVd on
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant
physician's trial for negligent homicide involving the death of an infant after a premature
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), revM on other grounds,
813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).

25

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
History: C. 1953,76-10-104, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 39; 1989, ch. 194, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1974.cn. 32, § 39 repealed former § 76-10-104,

76-10-105.1

as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104,
relating to use of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco in
enclosed public place, and enacted present
§ 76-10-104.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 16.
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 92, 95.
AJLJL — Civil liability for tobacco sales to

minors, 55 A.L.R.4th 1238.
Key Numbers. — Infants «=> 13.

76-10-105. Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or tobacco by minors — Penalty — Compliance officer
authority — Juvenile court jurisdiction.
(1) Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C
misdemeanor, or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
(2) A compliance officer appointed by a board of education under Section
53A-3-402 may issue citations for violations of this section committed on school
property. Cited violations shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile court.
History: C. 1953,76-10-105, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 40; 1986, ch. 26, § 19; 1988,
ch. 2, § 341; 1989, ch. 194, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1974, ch. 32, § 40 repealed former § 76-10-105
(enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104),

relating to abuse of psychotoxic chemical solvents, and enacted present § 76-10-105. For
present provisions regarding psychotoxic
chemical solvents, see § 76-10-107.
Cross-References. — Juvenile court jurisdiction, § 78-3a-16.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 15.
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants § 196.

Key Numbers. — Infants «=» 68.

76-10-105.1. Prohibition of gift or sale of cigarettes or
tobacco through vending machines — Exceptions — Penalties.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the gift or sale of cigarettes or
tobacco in any form through vending machines or tobacco product machines is
prohibited in this state.
(2) (a) A bar, or a privately owned and operated club or association that has
a private club liquor license under Title 32A, Chapter 5, or that requires
membership and charges a membership fee, may maintain cigarette or
tobacco product vending machines on its premises.
(b) A workplace may maintain cigarette or tobacco product vending
machines for its adult employees, in an area not available to the general
public.
(3) Violation of this section is a class C misdemeanor on the first offense, a
class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on
subsequent offenses.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-105.1, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 194, § 3.
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78-3a-801

JUDICIAL CODE

PART 8
ADULT OFFENSES
78-3a-801. Jurisdiction of adults for offenses against minors — Proof of delinquency not required for
conviction.
(1) The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to try the following adults
for offenses committed against minors:
(a) any person 18 years of age or older who:
(i) solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
or who acts with a minor in the violation of any federal, state, or local
law or municipal ordinance;
(ii) tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent; or
(iii) aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect,
abuse, or delinquency of any minor;
(b) any person 18 years or older, having a minor in his legal custody, or
under his care, or in his employment, who willfully abuses or ill-treats,
neglects, or abandons the minor in any manner likely to cause the minor
unnecessary suffering or serious injury to his health or morals;
(c) any person 18 years or older who:
(i) forcibly takes away a minor from, or wrongfully encourages him
to leave, the legal or physical custody of any person, agency, or
institution in which the minor lawfully resides or has been legally
placed for the purpose of care, support, education, or adoption; or
(ii) knowingly detains or harbors a minor whom he has reasonable
grounds to believe has escaped or fled from the custody of any agency
or institution in which the minor lawfully resides or has run away
from his parent, guardian, or custodian;
(d) any person 18 years of age or older who:
(i) provides a minor with an alcoholic beverage or a controlled
substance; or
(ii) encourages or permits a minor to consume an alcoholic beverage or controlled substance; or
(e) any person 18 years of age or older who fails to report child abuse, as
required by Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect
Reporting Requirements.
(2) It is not necessary in order to obtain a conviction under this statute to
establish that the minor had become a delinquent or committed a delinquent
act.
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-801, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 1, § 72.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94
makes the act effective on January 31, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Contributing to delinquency of minor.
— Evidence sufficient.
— Proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Sheltering runaway child.

Contributing to delinquency of minor.
— Evidence sufficient.
Where defendant, an osteopathic physician,
gave prescriptions for excessive quantities of
amphetamines and barbiturates to a seven-
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vs«
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JOSEPH K. KRUEGER,
Defendant

Case No.: 971700509

On September 12, 1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss together with a Memorandum
in Support. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 1997, and the court took the
matter under advisement and now issues this ruling.
The Information charges the defendant with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of
a Minor, each a Class B Misdemeanor. However, Count IV was later dismissed because the student
named therein was eighteen years old at the time and therefore not a minor. The offenses allegedly
took place on February 18, 1997, on the campus of Carbon High School during a KTVX news
interview with a number of students as a result of which the five students were issued tobacco
citations. Defendant asserts that the Information should be dismissed because (1) the defendant did
nothing to contribute to unlawful conduct by the students, and (2) penalizing journalists for exercising
First Amendment rights is patently unconstitutional.
I. Does the Defendant's Conduct Violate Sec. 78-3a-801?
At the outset, the court notes that the four minor students and one 18 year old adult student
identified in the Information, all of whom were students at Carbon High, were issued tobacco
citations alleging violation of Section 76-10-105 Utah Code Annotated. A review of that section
reveals that the essence of that offense lies in the buying, accepting, or possessing of tobacco by
anyone under the age of 19. It is significant to note that the statute does not specify "use" of tobacco
as an element of the offense. The gist of the offense lies in the "possessing" of the substance.
A. Subparagraph (I)
The State has not disputed the allegation contained in paragraph nine of defendants'
memorandum to the effect that the tobacco possessed by the minors was not furnished by the
defendant and there has been no allegation made that the defendant furnished or provided the minors
with the chewing tobacco. It is also affirmatively alleged numerous times in defendants'
memorandum and at oral argument that the students already had the tobacco in their possession at
the time they were approached by the defendant for the interview, which allegations were not
disputed by the State.
In reviewing the section under which the defendant is charged, 78-3a-801(l)(a) Utah Code
Annotated, the court finds that the defendant did not commit the offense stated in subsection (I) for
the reason that the offense of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the students and
1

was in the process of being committed when the students were approached by the defendant.
B. Subparagraph (ii)
There is a dispute as to whether the defendant told thefivestudents to chew tobacco on camera.
Paragraph 11 in the brief states that defendant did not tell the students to chew and that defendant
said she told the students to "simply do what they would ordinarily do," whereas paragraph nine of
the brief states that some of the students allege that defendant and the co-defendant asked them to
chew tobacco on camera. At this stage of the proceedings it is impermissible for the court to
determine which of the two versions, if either, is correct, and that decision is left to the fact-finder.
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant asked the students to chew tobacco on
camera that was already in the students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant
prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, and that by
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the defendant tended to cause "minors to
remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-801(1 )(ii).
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the defendant did not violate
Section 78-3a-801 is denied.
II. Is the Utah Statute Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied?
Defendant asserts that Section 78-3a-801(l)(a), as applied in this case, violates the defendant's
First Amendment rights because it is unconstitutionally vague, and specifically argues that the
language "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent" is too vague to apprise reporters
that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview juveniles engaged in illegal behavior.
The court finds that the wording of the statue in question is sufficiently specific to apprise
reporters of proscribed conduct. The court is mindful that reporters have a constitutionally protected
right to report illegal activity, but the issue this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter
exceeded the scope of that right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that
tended to cause minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality.
Although the defendant urges the court to find that the statue is vague and cites the ruling of an
Alabama decision involving nearly identical language, the court finds that wording of the statute in
question is sufficiently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The motion to dismiss on
constitutional grounds is therefore denied.
DATED this 2nd day of January, 1998.

BRYCE K. &RYNER
District Court Judge
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Case No.: 971700508

On September 12, 1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss together with a Memorandum
in Support. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 1997, and the court took the
matter under advisement and now issues this ruling.
The Information charges the defendant with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of
a Minor, each a Class B Misdemeanor. However, Count IV was later dismissed because the student
named therein was eighteen years old at the time and therefore not a minor. The offenses allegedly
took place on February 18, 1997, on the campus of Carbon High School during a KTVX news
interview with a number of students as a result of which the five students were issued tobacco
citations. Defendant asserts that the Information should be dismissed because (1) the defendant did
nothing to contribute to unlawful conduct by the students, and (2) penalizing journalists for exercising
First Amendment rights is patently unconstitutional.
I. Does the Defendant's Conduct Violate Sec. 78-3a-801?
At the outset, the court notes that the four minor students and one 18 year old adult student
identified in the Information , all of whom were students at Carbon High, were issued tobacco
citations alleging violation of Section 76-10-105 Utah Code Annotated. A review of that section
reveals that the essence of that offense lies in the buying, accepting, or possessing of tobacco by
anyone under the age of 19. It is significant to note that the statute does not specify "use" of tobacco
as an element of the offense. The aist of the offense lies in the "possessing" of the substance.
A. Subparagraph (I)
The State has not disputed the allegation contained in paragraph nine of defendants'
memorandum to the effect that the tobacco possessed by the minors was not furnished by the
defendant and there has been no allegation made that the defendant furnished or provided the minors
with the chewing tobacco. It is also affirmatively alleged numerous times in defendants'
memorandum and at oral argument that the students already had the tobacco in their possession at
the time they were approached by the defendant for the interview, which allegations were not
disputed by the State.
In reviewing the section under which the defendant is charged, 73-3a-801(l)(a) Utah Code
Annotated, the court finds that the defendant did not commit the offense stated in subsection (I) for
the reason that the offense of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the students and
1

was in the process of being committed when the students were approached by the defendant.
B. Subparagraph (ii)
There is a dispute as to whether the defendant told thefivestudents to chew tobacco on camera.
Paragraph 11 in the brief states that defendant did not tell the students to chew and that defendant
said she told the students to "simply do what they would ordinarily do," whereas paragraph nine of
the brief states that some of the students allege that defendant and the co-defendant asked them to
chew tobacco on camera. At this stage of the proceedings it is impermissible for the court to
determine which of the two versions, if either, is correct, and that decision is left to the fact-finder.
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant asked the students to chew tobacco on
camera that was already in the students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant
prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, and that by
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the defendant tended to cause "minors to
remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-801(1 )(ii).
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the defendant did not violate
Section 78-3a-801 is denied.
n. Is the Utah Statute Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied?
Defendant asserts that Section 78-3a-801(l)(a), as applied in this case, violates the defendant's
First Amendment rights because it is unconstitutionally vague, and specifically argues that the
language "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent" is too vague to apprise reporters
that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview juveniles engaged in illegal behavior.
The court finds that the wording of the statue in question is sufficiently specific to apprise
reporters of proscribed conduct. The court is mindful that reporters have a constitutionally protected
right to report illegal activity, but the issue this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter
exceeded the scope of that right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that
tended to cause minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality.
Although the defendant urges the court to find that the statue is vague and cites the ruling of an
Alabama decision involving nearly identical language, the court finds that wording of the statute in
question is sufficiently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The motion to dismiss on
constitutional grounds is therefore denied.
DATED this 2nd day of January, 1998.
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BRYCE K. B ^ N E R
District Court Judge
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3RD CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
In re: UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Debtor
Civil No. 89-0561 (CRR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
106 Bankr. 323; 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927; 16 Media L. Rep. 2401
September 1, 1989, Decided
September 1, 1989, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended September 22,
1989.
COUNSEL: [**1] Plaintiff: Robert Merce, Schutter
& Glickstein, Honolulu, Hawaii; Duane D Morse,
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
Defendant: Paul Alston, Robyn B. Chun, Mei
Nakamoto, Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, Honolulu,
Hawaii; Bruce W. Sanford, Leonard H. Freiman, Baker
& Hostetler, Washington, District of Columbia.
JUDGES: Charles R. Richey, United States District
Judge.
OPINIONBY: RICHEY
OPINION: [*323] OPINION OF CHARLES R.
RICHEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CHARLES R. RICHEY,
DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED

STATES

United Press International ("UPI"), the debtor in this
action, has moved for summary judgment on Larry
Mehau's claim for [*324] damages. The dispute arises
out of allegedly defamatory statements that a UPI reporter sent over the UPI wire in 1977. Mehau, then
a member of Hawaii's Board of Land and Natural
Resources, claims that the statements soiled his name
by linking him to underworld activity in Hawaii. For
the reasons stated herein, UPI's motion for summary
judgment shall be granted.
A. Factual Background
On June 15, 1977, The Valley Isle, a bi-weekly,
Honolulu-based newspaper (now defunct), published a
story on the recent death of George Helm, a Hawaiian
environmental activist. The Valley Isle story strongly

implied that Helm and another man had been killed by
local underworld [**2] figures. The story included an
interview with Adolph Helm, George's brother; Adolph
claimed in the interview that George had told him and
others before his death that he had unearthed strong
evidence of underworld influence in Hawaii politics.
Adolph further stated that George had told a group of
approximately 100 people that Larry Mehau was the
"Godfather" of organized crime in Hawaii. Adolph also
recounted an incident at a local restaurant in which, according to George, Mehau had personally threatened to
"break George's ass" unless George ceased his efforts to
uncover local corruption. George Helm disappeared off
the coast of a Hawaiian island on March 7, 1977.
Dennis Stone, a UPI reporter, became aware of the
Valley Isle story on the date of its publication. The
record indicates that the question of mob influence in
Hawaii politics had generated some media interest in the
preceding months. Stone had been aware of this interest,
and upon learning of the Valley Isle story, he regarded it
as an opportunity to "scoop" the competition, nl Stone
immediately called the Maui News newspaper, where an
unidentified employee read to him portions of the Valley
Isle story. Stone [**3] then called the Press Secretary of
the Governor of Hawaii and asked for comment on the
Valley Isle story. The Press Secretary had no information on the story or its contents. After unsuccessfully
attempting to reach Adolph Helm, Stone spoke with the
Helms' father, George Sr., who confirmed that George
had discussed threats from Larry Mehau. Based upon
these discussions, Stone sent the following story over
the national wire:
Adolph Helm . . . . brother of the missing Hawaiian
activist George Helm . . . . was quoted today in the
biweekly Valley Isle Press as naming State Land Board
Big Island member Larry Mehau as the "Godfather" of

Page 4
106 Bankr. 323, *324; 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13927, **3;
16 Media L. Rep. 2401
Hawaii's underworld crime. Adolph Helm also was
quoted as reveling [sic] that his brother, now feared
dead, said Mehau threatened him when Helm was a musician at Honolulu's Gold Coin restaurant. The Helm
brothers' father confirmed that George Helm said he
was repeatedly threatened. Before he apparently died,
George Helm told his brother he had a lot to reveal
about Hawaii's organized crime. Adolph Helm also reportedly fingered Marcus Lipske, believed the manager
of singer Don Ho, as the local underworld's link with
the mainland syndicate. n2

nl Stone Dep. at 52.
r**4]
n2 Exh. 8 to UPI Mem. (ellipses in original).
After distributing this first story, Stone was able to
make contact with Adolph Helm. Adolph confirmed
to Stone that the substance of the Valley Isle story accurately reflected what he had told the Valley Isle reporters.
n3 Stone was also able to obtain a copy of the Valley Isle
and read the story for himself. He thereafter sent the following over the UPI wire, approximately an hour after
the first story:
Adolph Helm, the brother of the missing and feared
dead
[*325] Hawaiian activist George Helm, revealed today that George Helm told many of his follwers [sic]
that State Board of Land and Natural Resources member Larry Mehau of the Big Island is the Godfather of
Hawaii's underworld. Helm, interviewed at his Molokai
residence, said his brother told 40 to 50 people prior to
a March "invasion" of Kahoolawe that Mehua [sic] and
other people ~ quote — "higher up" were deeply involved
in organized crime. Helm quoted his brother as saying
he was planning to expose them and "all the corruption
that was happening." Helm's apparent death this past
March is believed being investigated by Maui County
and the FBI. n4

n3 Mehau submitted an affidavit in which he stated
that Adolph Helm later met with him and complained
that the Valley Isle had misquoted and distorted his
comments. However, Adolph's deposition, taken after the meeting with Mehau, shows that Adolph was
comfortable with the Valley Isle story, and believed
that it fairly reflected his views. Helm Dep. at 24-

29. In any event, as will be shown, this dispute is
not material to the legal issues underlying the Court's
ruling.
[**5]
n4 Exh. 7 to UPI Mem.
The next day, on June 16, UPI distributed a story detailing Governor George Ariyoshi's strong defense of
Mehau and his categorical rejection of the Valley Isle
story.
The record indicates that Stone was a relatively inexperienced reporter, and that he distributed the Mehau
story on his last day with UPI. It appears that he knew
next to nothing of the Valley Isle at the time he distributed his stories. n5 The record further indicates that
while the Valley Isle story and Stone's releases gained
the attention of some members of the local media, others
deemed the information unreliable and refused to report
the Valley Isle story. n6
n5 At his deposition, Stone indicated that when he
distributed the stories, "the entirety" of his knowledge of the Valley Isle was "that they had run this
story and that it was a bi-weekly newspaper on the
island of Maui." Stone Dep. at 49.
n6 For instance, Robert Sevey, a reporter with
KGMB-TV in Honolulu, refused to report the Valley
Isle story because of his doubts as to the newspaper's
reliability. See Sevey Dep. at 10-11.
Mehau brought this defamation action in Hawaii state
court against UPI [**6] and several other defendants
on June 23, 1977. After approximately two years of
discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in
UPI's favor. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii reversed, finding that the record contained sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury might find,
under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270-71, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), that
Stone acted with actual malice when he sent the two
stories over the UPI wire. Mehau v. Gannett Pacific
Corp., 66Haw. 133, 658P.2d312 (1983). The Hawaii
Supreme Court's opinion dealt only with the actual malice standard as applied to the record before it.
In April of 1985, after remand and additional discovery, Mehau stipulated to the dismissal of his claims
against all non-diverse defendants, leaving only UPI in
the case. On May 16, 1985 UPI filed with the state court
a Notice of Bankruptcy Petition and Automatic Stay. On
May 17, 1985, UPI removed the suit to the United States
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District Court for the District of Hawaii. In April of
1985, however, before the Hawaii district court could
dispose of the case, UPI declared bankruptcy in the
District of Columbia. UPI's bankruptcy stayed proceedings in the [**7] Hawaii action, and forced Mehau to
file a claim against UPI in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Columbia. UPI objected to the
claim, and filed the instant motion for summary judgment under Bankruptcy Rules 7056 and 9014. In turn,
the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte requested a withdrawal
of the reference of Mehau's claim because it raised the
prospect of a jury trial. The matter came to this Court,
and UPI's motion for summary judgment is now ripe for
decision.
B. ANALYSIS
UPI offers two basic arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. First, surveying the evidence, UPI contends that the record lacks any rational
basis for a finding (1) that Stone acted with actual malice
under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan when he distributed the two stories, or (2) that Mehau has carried
his burden of proving the falsity of Stone's statements
by clear and convincing evidence. Second, UPI contends that, regardless of Mehau's evidentiary showing,
Stone's comments are absolutely privileged under the
doctrine of neutral reportage, a theory first enunciated
by the Second Circuit in Edwards v. National Audubon
Society, 556F.2d 113 (2d Cir. [**8] 1977). Because the
Court [*326] is in partial agreement with UPI as to its
first argument, and in total agreement as to its second,
the Court will grant UPI's motion.
1. Insufficiency of the Evidence
A. Actual Malice
UPI first contends that no reasonable juror could find,
from the facts presented in the record, that Stone transmitted the two stories over the UPI wire with actual malice. Derived from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), the
actual malice standard requires (in this case) that Mehau
show by clear and convincing evidence that Stone acted
either "with knowledge that [the statements] were false,"
or "with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false
or not." Id. at 279-80. If Mehau cannot make this
showing, the "central meaning of the first amendment,"
id. at 273, compels dismissal of his claim.
While this Court's independent review of the record
might produce a different result, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii has already applied the actual malice standard to
the facts of this case. And that court has concluded that a
reasonable juror might find Stone's actions to have been
undertaken with reckless disregard for the statement's

accuracy, [**9] and thus with actual malice under New
York Times. Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 66 Haw.
133, 147-48, 658 P.2d 312 (1983). n7 The Supreme
Court's decision on this particular question is the law of
the case.
n7 The Supreme Court of Hawaii expressed its
views as follows:
UPI's treatment of the information gleaned from
another source, the fact that the source was a new
publication apparently given to sensationalizing the
"news," and the anonymity of the authors of some
of the crucial accusations published by the Valley
Isle are a few of the factors we believe could lead
to a finding by a jury that UPI's republication of
the charges of criminality was not "made in good
faith" or they were such that "only a reckless man
would have put them in circulation." St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 20
L. Ed. 2d 262.
Id.
The Supreme Court's decision concededly rests upon a
determination of federal law (i.e., a federal defense to a
state law claim). This factor generally militates against
a finding that a state court determination should control after the matter has been removed to federal court.
Nevertheless, a careful reading of the Supreme Court's
decision shows that the Supreme [**10] Court carefully
applied - indeed presaged by some three years - the currently controlling law in this area. Contrary to UPI's
assertion, the United States Supreme Court's subsequent
decisions in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), and
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed.
2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986), do not somehow invalidate the Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision on the
actual malice issue. The Court agrees with UPI that
Liberty Lobby and Celotex altered the law of summary
judgment in various respects. Nevertheless, it appears to
the Court (1) that the Supreme Court of Hawaii applied
precisely the test set forth in Liberty Lobby, n8 and (2)
that the rule of Celotex has no bearing upon this case.
Thus, the Court declines to accept UPI's contention that
recent developments in federal law - i.e., the Liberty
Lobby and Celotex decisions - warrant disruption of the
Supreme Court's decision in Mehau. [*327] The values
expressed in the law of the case doctrine are more compelling. While UPI might disagree with the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Mehau, the fact that the proper
standard appears to have been applied is sufficient rea-
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son to leave undisturbed [**11] a thoroughly reasoned
decision of the highest court of Hawaii.
n8 Summarized, the rule of Liberty Lobby might
be stated as follows: (1) on summary judgment,
a court is to review the non-movant's evidentiary
showing through the prism of the substantive standard that would control at a trial on the merits; and
(2) in determining which factual disputes are "material, " the court is to give credence only to those facts
upon which a reasonable juror might base a finding
for the non-movant (in other words, the summary
judgment standard is essentially the same as the directed verdict standard). With this in mind, consider the Supreme Court's statement in Mehau that
on summary judgment in a defamation action a court
"examines the evidence, taking all permissible inferences and resolving questions of credibility in plaintiff s favor to determine whether a reasonable jury
acting reasonably could find actual malice with convincing clarity." Mehau, 66 Haw. at 145, 658 P2d
at 321 (quoting Nader v. Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 50
(D.C. 1979) (emphasis in original). It appears to the
Court that this standard is precisely that set forth in
Liberty Lobby.

B. Burden of [**12] Proving Falsity
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, did not address the second of UPI's "evidentiary" contentions that Mehau has failed to carry his burden of proving
the falsity of Stone's statements. n9 UPI's argument is
based upon Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783, 106 S. Ct. 1558
(1986). In Hepps, the United States Supreme Court effectively interposed an additional "element" that a plaintiff must prove in order to surmount a New York Times
defense: not only must a plaintiff show that challenged
statements were made with actual malice, a plaintiff must
show as well that the statements were false. UPI argues
that the record lacks any proof that Stone's statements
were false. The Court agrees; no reasonable juror could
find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the
statements Stone sent over the national wire were false.
nlO Summary judgment in UPI's favor is therefore compelled.
n9 The Supreme Court of Hawaii did indicate that
it regarded Stone's stories as potentially misleading.
66 Haw. at 146-47, 658 P.2d at 321-22. Yet, the
Supreme Court's statements were dicta, and were
made in connection with its discussion of reckless-

ness under the actual malice standard. They do not
represent a holding that Mehau had satisfied his burden of proving falsity.
[**13]
nlO UPI asserts that Mehau must prove falsity under Hepps by clear and convincing evidence. UPI
Mem. at 16. In Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 E
Supp. 241, 248 (D.D.C. 1987), Judge Joyce Hens
Green of this Court did conclude, for persuasive reasons, that the Hepps analysis commands clear and
convincing evidence. Nevertheless, in at least two
opinions after Robertson, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has stated that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies with respect
to the Hepps falsity determination. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. v. Rees, 271 US. App. D.C. 297, 852 F.2d
595, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dictum); Liberty Lobby,
Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 267 U.S. App. D.C.
337, 838E2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Bork,
J.) ("at least a fair preponderance of the evidence").
This Court will thus assume that the preponderance
of the evidence is applicable, although, given the
Court's conclusion that Mehau has failed to make
even this less stringent showing, the choice of standards is without great significance.
The Court is perfectly willing to draw from the record
the conclusion that Mehau is not a mobster; that he is not
the "Godfather" of the Hawaii underworld. A reasonable [** 14] juror could do the same. The issue, however,
is not whether Mehau was or was not affiliated with the
underworld. The issue is whether Mehau has offered
sufficient evidence that the two statements Stone sent
over the UPI wire on June 15, 1977, were inaccurate.
He has not.
It is crucial to consider precisely what Stone's statements said. The first, issued at 12:55 p.m., reported
the fact that the Valley Isle had released a story in which
Adolph Helm had revealed his brother George's view
that Mehau was the "Godfather" of the Hawaii underworld. The second story, issued at 1:50 p.m., after Stone
had actually spoken with Adolph Helm, simply reported
once again the fact that Adolph Helm had stated that his
brother George had told others that Mehau was involved
with organized crime in Hawaii. The stories involve the
reporting of, first, the substance of the Valley Isle story,
and, second, the substance of Adolph Helm's comments
to the Valley Isle and to Stone himself. Both stories
make abundantly clear that the Helm brothers - and not
Stone - were leveling the charges against Mehau. In a
sense, the stories are tantamount to the reporting of two
physical events: (1) Adolph's [**15] statements to the
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Valley Isle; and the Valley Isle's subsequent repeating of
those statements in its edition of June 15, 1977.
Mehau has offered nothing to indicate that those physical events did not occur. There is no dispute that the
Valley Isle printed a story on June 15, 1977, in which
Adolph Helm reported his brother's view that Mehau
was a member of the Hawaii underworld. The Valley
Isle did print such a story. To be sure, Mehau attacks
the [*328] first sentence of Stone's first story, which
begins: "Adolph Helm . . . . was quoted today .
. . . as naming State Land Board Big Island member Larry Mehau as the "Godfather" of Hawaii's underworld crime." In a purely technical sense, this assertion is incorrect. Adolph Helm did not himself "name"
Mehau; rather, Adolph only repeated to the Valley Isle
his brother's view that Mehau was connected to the underworld. Yet, in the Court's view, this technical error
does not rise to the level of "falsity" contemplated under Hepps. Cf., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279,
290, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45, 91 S. Ct. 633 (1971) ("falsification" for purposes of actual malice standard). See
also Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S. App. DC. 39,
817 F.2d 762, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (minor [**16]
inaccuracies cannot "in reason and in law" support liability for defamation); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 581A, comment f (1977) ("It is not necessary [for
a defendant] to establish the literal truth of the precise
statement made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are
immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true
in substance."), n i l
n i l The same conclusion applies as a matter of
law to the fact that, while the Valley Isle story recounted only one incident in which Mehau allegedly
threatened George Helm, Stone's first story claimed
that Helm's father had said that George had been "repeatedly" threatened by Mehau. Even if erroneous,
Stone's statement is not "false" as a matter of law
under Hepps.
As for Stone's second story, Mehau has offered no evidence that Adolph Helm did not tell Stone, after Stone
contacted Helm at his Molokai residence, that his brother
George "had told many of his followers that [Mehau] .
. . . is the Godfather of Hawaii's underworld," or that
Helm did not tell Stone of the other matters contained
in the second story. Quite the contrary, Adolph Helm's
deposition testimony indicates that Helm confirmed to
Stone that he had spoken [**17] with the Valley Isle,
and that the Valley Isle had accurately reported his comments. nl2 There is some question as to precisely what
types of questions Stone asked Helm when they spoke,

but this dispute in no way suggests that Adolph Helm
did not "reveal" on June 15 the matters contained in the
second story. nl3

nl2 Helm Dep. at 40.
nl3 Mehau relies upon a meeting following all
of this between himself and Adolph Helm at which
Helm is alleged to have retracted his statements to
the Valley Isle and to have claimed that he was misquoted by the Valley Isle. Mehau Aff. (February
11, 1980). Although Helm's deposition contradicts
Mehau's affidavit, the Court would decide no differently even if Mehau's affidavit were absolutely
correct. While it might be relevant to the accuracy
of the Valley Isle story, nothing in Mehau's affidavit
impugns in any way the accuracy of Stone's stories.
In the Court's view, no reasonable juror could find that
Mehau has proven by "a fair preponderance of the evidence" that either of Stone's stories were "false" within
the meaning of Hepps. Mehau has offered nothing to indicate that the events and statements described in Stone's
[**18] stories did not occur, or that Stone did not depict those events and statements with substantial accuracy. Summary judgment must be granted in UPI's favor. See Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones, Inc., 267 U.S.
App. D.C. 337, 838 F.2d 1287, 1294-96 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (where no reasonable juror could find challenged
statements false, summary judgment granted in defendant's favor).
2. Neutral Reportage
Notwithstanding the foregoing, UPI also argues that
Stone's stories are absolutely immune from defamation
liability under the neutral reportage doctrine. The Court
agrees.
The neutral reportage doctrine finds its genesis in
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 556 F.2d 113
(2d Cir.) cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S. Ct. 647,
54 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). In Edwards, the Second
Circuit held defamation liability "constitutionally impermissible" where the defendant, the New York Times,
had merely reported charges levelled by the National
Audubon Society against certain scientists. As "succinctly stated" by Judge Kaufman, "when a responsible, prominent organization like the National Audubon
Society makes serious charges against a public figure,
the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those [**19] charges, [*329] regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their
validity." Id. at 120.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has yet to speak regarding the neutral reportage doctrine, see White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 707 E
Supp. 579, 596 (D.D.C. 1989), and those circuits that
have considered the doctrine have left its contours rather
ill-defined. For instance, in an en banc decision shortly
after Edwards, the Second Circuit itself expressed some
concerns with the doctrine's potential breadth. See
Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 E2d 54, 69 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("The need for the careful limitation of a constitutional privilege for fair reportage is demonstrated
by the breadth of that defense, which confers immunity
even for publishing statements believed to be untrue.").
And the Third Circuit has expressly declined to follow
Edwards. Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 E2d 1221, 1225-26
(3d Cir. 1978). nl4 The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, appears to have adopted a relatively expansive conception
of the doctrine, permitting its application even when the
author makes clear his or her personal views on the reported matter. Price v. Viking [**20] Penguin, Inc., 881
E2d 1426, slip op. at 12 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, S.J.).
In this Court's view, the logic of the doctrine, coupled
with the weight of federal precedent, favor adoption of
a neutral reportage doctrine in this circuit. However,
as the ambiguity surrounding the content of the doctrine
indicates, what the Court adopts is less than perfectly
clear.
nl4 But see Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 E2d
134, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981) (while not repudiating Dickey, noting that Pennsylvania Supreme Court
might be inclined to adopt neutral reportage doctrine
in light of the "trend of federal case law" supporting
such a privilege).
Among the undefined aspects of the privilege is the
weight to be given each of the factors Mehau relies
upon in opposing UPI's motion for summary judgment.
Mehau's argument rests upon the specific facts and language of Edwards itself. In Edwards, Judge Kaufman's
language arguably limited the doctrine's use to cases in
which the initial "defamer" is a "responsible, prominent organization like the National Audubon Society."
556 E2d at 120. Mehau contends that because the initial "defamers" were the Valley Isle and Adolph Helm,
[**21] and because neither of them were "responsible"
or "prominent" in the sense that the National Audubon
Society was in Edwards, UPI cannot rely upon the doctrine in this case.
Judge Kaufman may well have intended to limit the
doctrine through his choice of language in Edwards. See
also Cianci, 639 E2d at 68. Nevertheless, this Court is

of the view that such a limitation to the reiteration only of
statements of "responsible" or "prominent" "defamers"
is inconsistent with the raison d'etre of the doctrine. It
is essential that the press be at liberty to report serious
charges against public officials without excessive concern for the source. Were the press secure only in reporting the charges of "responsible" or "prominent" persons
or entities - with these terms undoubtedly defined in
light of the values of some established class - the "robust and unintimidated press" for which Judge Kaufman
showed such concern would undoubtedly suffer. nl5
nl5 See Edwards, 556 E2d at 120 ("if we are
to enjoy the blessings of a robust and unintimidated
press, we must provide immunity from defamation
suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and
in good faith, that his report accurately conveys the
charges made.").
[**22] This Court is more comfortable with the views
expressed in Judge Patel's carefully reasoned opinion in
Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122-28 (N.D.
Cal. 1984). In Barry, Judge Patel rejected an argument
identical to Mehau's, and held that "a more sensible approach is to extend the neutral reportage privilege to all
republications of serious charges by one participant in an
existing public controversy against another participant in
that controversy, regardless of the 'trustworthiness' of
the original defamer." Id. at 1126. Judge Patel properly noted that "it is the neutrality of the report which
is critical." Id. at 1127. If neutrality is maintained, the
public - as opposed to the reporter or a judge — [*330]
can serve as thefinalarbiter of the trustworthiness of the
defamer and his statements. Id. The First Amendment,
it seems to the Court, demands no less. Accordingly,
having interpreted the neutral reportage doctrine in this
fashion, the Court finds that the status of the Valley Isle
and Adolph Helm as "unresponsible" or "unprominent"
nl6 does not negate application of the neutral reportage
doctrine in this case.
nl6 The Court recognizes that Barry dealt only
with the question of whether a defamer need be
"responsible," and did not address whether he or
she need be "prominent." In that case, the court
expressly found that the original defamer (basketball player Quentin Dailey) was "prominent." In the
Court's view, however, there should be no requirement that an original defamer be either "responsible"
or "prominent." A prominence requirement is essentially an additional safeguard of trustworthiness,
and, as noted above, trustworthiness of the defamer
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is not (or should not be) a prerequisite to the neutral
reportage defense.
[**23] The second basis upon which Mehau would
avoid UPI's neutral reportage defense in this case is
through reliance upon the fact that, in Edwards, the reporter "in good faith elicited both sides of the story to
the best of his ability." Id. at 118. Mehau contends that,
unlike the reporter in Edwards, Stone simply reiterated
the Valley Isle's charges without undertaking an independent investigation of their possible inaccuracy, and
without attempting to present Mehau's response. The
distinction between the facts in Edwards and the facts
here, according to Mehau, deprives UPI of the right to
rely upon the neutral reportage doctrine.
The Court cannot agree. The undisputed facts indicate that Stone did make adequate efforts to verify the
Valley Isle story. His stories did no more than repeat
only that which he had verified; as noted above, he reported only that individuals (who he named) had made
statements to the Valley Isle, and that the Valley Isle had
published those statements. In light of the constitutional
concerns underlying the neutral reportage doctrine, the
Court finds these efforts legally sufficient.
As for Stone's duty to report "both sides," [**24] it
appears to the Court that such an obligation is essentially an incident of the requirement, clearly expressed
in Edwards, that a reporter not espouse or concur in the
matter reported. nl7 See, e.g., Cianci, 639 E2d 54 at
69 (failure to report both sides, including the withholding of information in author's possession, effectively
caused report to espouse charges). Accordingly, such
an obligation does not arise when, as here, the report
is itself essentially factual, neutral and accurate. nl8
Clearly, reporting "both sides" may eliminate any risk
that a report will be construed as endorsing a reported
charge; but when, as here, reporting both sides adds
nothing to the neutrality of a simple and straightforward
story, it is not (or should not be) required. A close
reading of Edwards ~ appropriate in light of Mehau's
reliance upon the literal language of the opinion - makes
clear that, in Judge Kaufman's view, reporting both sides
is not a prerequisite to the neutral reportage defense; the
fair, accurate and neutral reiteration of the charges is
the key. In the Court's view, Stone's reports were that:
fair, accurate and neutral. Good journalistic practice
certainly [**25] suggests reporting all aspects of a controversy, and Stone's releases would have been better
had they contained opposition to the Valley Isle story.
But the absence of such opposition, at least under these
circumstances, does not deprive UPI of the right to rely
upon the neutral reportage doctrine.

nl7 See Edwards, 556 E2d at 120 ("a publisher
who in fact espouses or concurs in the charges made
by others, or who deliberately distorts these statements to launch a personal attack of his own on a
public figure, cannot rely on a privilege of neutral
reportage").
nl8 Clearly, this rule cannot be absolute; the more
factually involved and one-sided a report is, the
greater becomes the reporter's obligation to report
both sides of the story. The reports in this case,
however, can hardly be characterized as involved:
they were one paragraph statements of the fact that
charges had been made.
What we are left with, then, are two reports that accurately and neutrally reported serious charges made
against a public figure regarding a matter of great public [*331] interest. nl9 Regardless of the accuracy of
the underlying charges, the Court is of the view that
Stone's decision to distribute [**26] those stories over
the UPI wire is absolutely protected under the neutral
reportage doctrine. Summary judgment in UPI's favor
is appropriate.
nl9 Mehau also argues that the neutral reportage
doctrine, as articulated in Edwards, requires that the
reported charges must relate to a long-standing dispute of great public interest. He contrasts the facts
of Edwards, in which the dispute over DDT use had
been raging for a number of years, with this case, in
which, he claims, there had been little prior public
interest in the subject matter of Stone's report. Yet,
a fair reading of Edwards in no way indicates a requirement that the issues raised have been in the public eye for an extended period of time. Concededly,
Judge Patel in Barry seems to require that there be
an "existing public controversy" before a defendant
can invoke the privilege. 584 E Supp. at 1127.
To the extent Barry can be read to impose such a
requirement, however, this Court declines to follow
that portion of Judge Patel's analysis. So long as
charges are serious and "newsworthy," Edwards, 556
E2d at 120, the press should enjoy the freedom to
report them without regard for the "history" of the
dispute. Again, the public - and not the press or
judges - should be the final arbiters of the merits of
reported charges.
[**27] C. CONCLUSION
The Court agrees with Mehau that the Supreme
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Court of Hawaii's decision on the actual malice issue
forms the law of the case and should not be disturbed.
Nevertheless, with respect to issues not addressed by
the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the undisputed facts indicate that Mehau has failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Stone's reports are false.
Further, the undisputed facts indicate that Stone's reports
are absolutely protected under the neutral reportage doctrine, which the Court adopts herein for the first time in
this circuit. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary
judgment in UPI's favor. n20 An Order shall issue.
n20 Mehau also asks that further discovery be permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) before a ruling
on UPI's motion for summary judgment. This litigation, however, has been alive for over 12 years

(albeit with a stay of several years on account of
UPI's bankruptcy). This period has provided ample time within which the parties could have undertaken all necessary discovery. The only legal issue
which could conceivably have "surprised" Mehau is
the Court's decision under Hepps, which arguably
established a new federal rule of decision in 1986.
Yet, Mehau's own brief states his view that the Hepps
rule "has always been the law and certainly does
not represent a dramatic shift in determining how
defamation cases should be resolved." Mehau Mem.
at 18. There is accordingly no basis for further postponing a decision on the merits in this action.

[**28] Date: September 1, 1989

